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CICIPPIo V. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: PUTTING THE FOR-
EIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY Ac's COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES
EXCEPTION IN CONTEXT
I. INTRODUcTION
On September 12, 1986, an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist
group called the Revolutionary Justice Organization ("RJO")
kidnapped Joseph James Cicippio, chief accountant and deputy
controller at the American University of Beirut.1 During his
captivity, Cicippio was "chained to a radiator in a pitch-black
room, ' 2 routinely beaten and tortured with metal rods, rubber
hoses and sticks, striking about his head, feet, and stomach.3 He
was also starved, being fed only "rice and beans, old cheese and
stale bread."4 At the direction of the Iranian government, the
RJO held Cicippio captive until the United States agreed to
release Iranian assets worth $262,000,000, frozen in U.S. banks.
The money was frozen pursuant to Executive Order 12170,' issued
by President Jimmy Carter "as a response to the hostage taking at
the United States Embassy in Tehran" in 1979.6
On December 2, 1991, Cicippio was finally set free, "dumped
by the side of a dusty road just outside [Beirut],"7 after 1908 days
of captivity. In addition to his wounds from beatings, Cicippio also
suffered "frostbite on his hands and feet from being chained
outdoors during two winters."8 In exchange for Cicippio's release,
the United States released $278,000,000 in Iranian assets, substan-
tially fulfilling Iran's demands.9
1. William Tuohy, 5 Others Still 'in Hel4' Says Freed Captive, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1986, at Al.
2. Eva M. Rodriquez, Court Bars Suit by Forder Hezbollah Hostage, THE
RECORDER, Aug 11, 1994, at 2.
3. Dana Priest, Anderson Last U.S. Hostage is Freed, Ex-Captives Describe Beatings,
Deprivation, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1991, at Al.
4. Id
5. 44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (1979); 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (1993).
6. See Margot C. Wuebbels, Commercial Terrorism: A Commercial Activity Exception
Under § 1605(A)(2) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 1123, 1150
(1993).
7. Rodriquez, supra note 2, at 2.
8. Priest, supra note 3, at Al.
9. Emily Baker, Targeting Iran for Terrorists' Profit, AM. LAW., Dec. 1992, at 83.
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On October 14, 1992, Cicippio filed a lawsuit in a federal
district court in Washington, D.C. against Iran, "seeking six
hundred million in damages for claims that include false imprison-
ment and torture."1 Despite the fact that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act ("FSIA") generally grants foreign nations
immunity in federal courts, Cicippio claimed that the kidnapping
was a "commercial transaction for profit," thus falling under the
FSIA's "commercial activity" exception."
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected
this argument, granting Iran's motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.12 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia also rejected Cicippio's argument and affirmed the
lower court's decision.13
This Note examines the D.C. Circuit's decision to reject the
argument that "commercial terrorism," or terrorism-for-money,
fails to qualify as a commercial activity exception to the FSIA.
Part II of this Note presents an overview of the problem and
describes the historical development of foreign sovereign immuni-
ty. Part III presents the FSIA, its interpretation by federal courts,
exceptions to the FSIA, and the federal courts' interpretation of
the exceptions. Part IV discusses the D.C. Circuit's decision in the
Cicippio case, analyzing the reasoning, arguments, and justifica-
tions for the decision. This section also discusses the D.C. Circuit's
adoption of the commercial context requirement. Part V analyzes
the commercial context requirement. Part VI criticizes the
Cicippio decision and discusses what the court might have been
able to accomplish. Finally, this Note concludes that the D.C.
Circuit's decision was based on considerations foreclosed by the
statute and criticizes the D.C. Circuit's adoption of a new barri-
er-the commercial context requirement-for denying sovereign
immunity in human rights suits.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 9202300, 1993 WL 730748 (D.D.C. 1994).
13. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 726 (1995).
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II. AN OVERVIEW
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A federal court must have subject matter jurisdiction before
it can hear a case. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction over claims against foreign nations when
the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. 4 Thus, when the
foreign state defendant is entitled to foreign sovereign immunity,
subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.
B. Historical Development of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is grounded on the premise that "the
King can do no wrong."' 5 Traditionally, the doctrine provides a
sovereign government, or its political subdivisions, total immunity
from tort liability incurred by its officers or agents.'6 This
immunity is not absolute, however, and may be waived statutori-
ly.
17
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, as applied under interna-
tional law, provides foreign nations with immunity from judgments
in foreign courts. Justice Marshall, in Schooner Exch. v.
McFaddon,8 set out the basic structure for sovereign immunity
analysis in the international context. Although the decision was
written in 1812, his formulation of foreign sovereign immunity is
still very influential and is frequently cited.19
In granting in rem jurisdictional immunity to a French schoo-
ner,2' Justice Marshall argued that foreign sovereign immunity is
based on the host country's consent to not exercise jurisdiction
over the foreign country.2 The starting point of Marshall's
argument is the principle that "[t]he jurisdiction of the nation
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988).
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
16. Id.
17. The U.S. federal government has generally waived its sovereign immunity for non-
tort and tort claims. See Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (1988); see also Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1988).
18. 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) 116 (1812).
19. Thomas H. Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity,
50 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 162-63 (1982).
20. Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 146.
21. Id. at 136.
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within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute...
and susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.,22 Thus,
all exceptions to absolute jurisdiction within a nation's territory,
such as foreign sovereign immunity, "must be traced up to the
consent of the nation itself. ' Furthermore, the consent to waive
a portion of the sovereign's absolute jurisdiction may be express
or implied and may be revoked by the host nation.24
Policy reasons for the voluntary extension of immunity,
according to Marshall, generally rest on principles of mutual
respect for a nation's sovereignty. "[P]erfect equality and absolute
independence of sovereigns, and ... [a] common interest impelling
[different nations] to mutual intercourse,.. . have given rise to a
class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the
exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdic-
tion.
, 25
Early applications of this doctrine in the United States
provided foreign nations with absolute immunity. In Berizzi Bros.
Co. v. S.S. Pesaro,26 the Supreme Court, relying heavily on
Schooner Exch., expressly adopted the theory of absolute foreign
sovereign immunity.
[A]s a consequence of the absolute independence of every
sovereign authority, and of the international comity which
induces every sovereign state to respect the independence and
dignity of every other sovereign state, each and every court
should decline to exercise, by means of its Courts, any of its
territorial jurisdiction over any sovereign or ambassador of any
other state.27
The absolute immunity theory granted immunity to foreign
sovereigns for all of their activities, failing, however, to distinguish
between public and private acts.2' The distinction between a
foreign sovereign's public and private acts became increasingly
vital as nations began to increase their involvement in commercial
activities. Absolute immunity deprived a legal remedy for private
22. Id
23. Id
24. Id. at 137.
25. Schooner Exch. 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
26. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
27. Id. at 574.
28. David A. Brittenham, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Commercial Activity: A
Conflicts Approach, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1440, 1452 (1983).
704 [Vol. 17:701
Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran
citizens doing business with foreign governments.2 9 Moreover,
the Court "ignored the views of the State Department, which
favored restricting the privilege of sovereign immunity to a foreign
state's noncommercial activities.
30
Eventually, two Supreme Court cases in the 1940s eroded the
absolute immunity theory. In both Ex parte Peru3 and Mexico
v. Hoffman,32 Chief Justice Stone declared that the judiciary
should defer decisions regarding foreign sovereign immunity to the
Executive branch. "[W]hen the executive branch, through the
Department of State, determine[s] that a claim of sovereign
immunity should be allowed in the interests of foreign relations,
courts must accept and follow the executive determination.,
33
Thus, the power to determine foreign sovereign immunity
effectively shifted from the judiciary to the State Department.
The State Department seized this opportunity to influence the
development of foreign sovereign immunity and issued a policy
committed to the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity.
The "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity provides that "the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign
or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to
private acts (jure gestionis)."35 Thus, under the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity, a sovereign nation may lose its immunity
when either the State Department or the courts decides that the
sovereign's acts, for which the claim arises, are equivalent to
private acts.
The distinction between private and public acts was elusive,
however. With few guidelines, the State Department and the
courts "struggled to distinguish between the two categories."36
This struggle led to inconsistent results, ad hoc determinations of
immunity on a case by case basis, and no clear standards governing
immunity decisions. This result prompted Congress to act: "[t]he
indecision and ambiguities presented by this divergent application
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
32. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
33. Brittenham, supra note 28, at 1452.
34. See Letter from Jack B. Take, Acting Legal Adviser of the U.S. Dep't of State, to
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976).
35. Id.
36. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1125.
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in cases involving foreign sovereigns made the enactment of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act timely."37
III. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITES Acr ("FSIA")
A. Purpose of the FSIA
The FSIA's stated purpose is to "provide when and how
parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state . . . " in the
U.S. federal courts.3" This statute is the "sole and exclusive
standard to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity
raised by foreign states" and "pre-empt[s] any other State or
Federal law."
39
Courts recognize that the FSIA's chief objectives are to codify
the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity, to transfer the
ability to determine immunity back to the judiciary, to set up a
procedure for service of process, and to create a remedy for a
foreign nation's failure to pay judgments entered against it.'
B. Operation of the FSIA
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1604, a "foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States,, 41 unless
such immunity is contrary to an existing international agreement
or except as provided by § 1605.42 Courts construe both § 1604
and § 1605 as granting foreign nations immunity from suit in U.S.
courts unless a plaintiff clearly shows that the foreign nation's acts
fall within one of the exceptions.'0 Thus, once the foreign state
37. Id
38. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604.
39. Id
40. See Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 558 F. Supp. 358, 361 (D.C. Ill. 1983) (granting sovereign
immunity to Soviet Union because the tort exception did not apply); National Airmotive
Corp. v. Iran, 499 F. Supp. 401, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (denying U.S. request that the court
stay all proceedings for a indefinite period); Jet Line Serv, Inc. v. MV Marsa El Hariga,
462 F. Supp. 1165, 1170 (D.C. Md. 1978) (granting motion to release a vessel attached by
plaintiff because it violated the FSIA).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988).
42. Id.
43. See Bahsoon v. Pezetel, Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 507, 509 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (denying
immunity to the agent of a foreign government who was a U.S. citizen because the FSIA
does not apply to U.S. citizens); Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1106
(D.D.C. 1982) (holding that subject matter jurisdiction exists under the commercial
activities exception of the FSIA).
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establishes that it is a foreign state and that the claim relates to a
public act, the foreign state is presumed to have immunity unless
the plaintiff rebuts the presumption by offering evidence to prove
that an exception applies."
C. Exceptions to the FSIA
The general exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity are
described in 28 U.S.C. § 1605. Exceptions in this section include,
but are not limited to, waiver,45 suits regarding property situated
in the United States,' suits in admiralty to enforce maritime
liens,47 and commercial activities.'
The most important and widely used exception is the commer-
cial activity exception.' The theory underlying the exception is
that when the government is engaged in an activity that is
commercial in nature, the sovereign "divests itself ... of its
sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen ...
descend[ingj to [an equivalent] level with those with whom it
associates."'u
Whether the commercial activity exception will strip a foreign
sovereign of immunity depends upon a finding of three elements.
First, the court must characterize the foreign sovereign's activities
as "commercial" in nature.5 Second, the court must determine
that the lawsuit is "based on" that particular commercial activi-
ty.12 Finally, the court must find a nexus between those commer-
cial activities and the United States.
53
44. Alberti v. Empressa Nicaraguense de la Came, 705 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the activities of a Nicaraguan corporation did not fall within the FSIA's
commercial activity exception).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1988).
46. i § 1605(a)(4).
47. Id. § 1605(b).
48. I& § 1605(a)(2); see generally id § 1605 for other exceptions.
49. Id. § 1605(a)(2); see generally Brittenham, supra note 28, at 1140 ("Perhaps the
most significant exception permits suit to be brought for claims that arise from the
commercial activity of a foreign state."); Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1128 ("The
commercial activity exception is the most frequently contested of the foreign sovereign
immunity exceptions.").
50. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1483 (1993) (White, J., concurring)
(quoting Justice Marshall in Bank of United States v. Platers' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S.
904, 907 (1824)).
51. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1128.
52. Id
53. Id; see also De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.
1985); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
1995] 707
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1. Characterizing Activity as Commercial Activity
"Commercial activity" is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1603 as "either
a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act.''54 Additionally, the statute mandates that
determination of whether an activity is commercial should be made
by "reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose."55
Commercial conduct is generally defined as conduct that
"relates to or is connected with trade and traffic ... [and] business
or activity which is carried on for a profit."56 Thus, a sovereign's
act should be deemed a commercial activity if its nature is to carry
on trade, traffic, business, or profit as opposed to some govern-
mental interest.
Complications arise, however, when courts attempt to distin-
guish commercial activity from government activity in characteriz-
ing the activity's nature. It is often difficult to distinguish acts that
are connected with trade, traffic, and business from acts that
further some governmental interest.57 For example, in the
situation in which Mexico is sued by U.S. citizens for damages
caused by nuclear bomb testing commissioned and paid for by a
Canadian corporation near the Mexico/U.S. border, Mexico's
activity is arguably both a commercial activity-because it was
executing a contract with Canada for services rendered-and a
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
55. Id.; This purpose-versus-nature distinction was specifically placed in the statute
to prevent a finding of sovereign immunity if the foreign government argues that the
purpose of its activity is for the public. Id The distinction is important because a foreign
government can always argue that certain commercial activities are for the purpose of
furthering a governmental interest. One commentator argues that purpose test would tend
to increase the potential for abusive, subjective interpretation, and would produce a
"chilling" effect on the formation of contracts between private parties and foreign
governments, because the contracts may not be enforceable due to immunity. Gary Jay
Greener, The Commercial Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity: To Be Immune or
Not to Be Immune? That Is the Question, 15 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 173, 198-99
(1992).
56. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 270 (defining "commercial" and
"commercial activity").
57. This is especially true when the activity meets several requirements: it is
noncontractual in nature; it exhibits both commercial and governmental characteristics; it
had a direct effect in the United States but no other territorial contracts with the forum;
and it occurred in the defendant state's territory. Brittenham, supra note 28, at 1444-45.
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governmental activity-because a country's military activities are
normally considered a sovereign act."8
To distinguish between a commercial and a non-commercial
activity, the courts commonly ask whether a private party could
have engaged in a similar activity.59 This "private person test"
was first used by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Nigeria. 6 In Texas Trading, the
Nigerian government was sued for breaching a contract to
purchase cement." The court reasoned that a private person can
engage in the activity engaged in by Nigeria, namely purchasing
cement, and concluded that no immunity should be granted.62
In Argentina v. Weltover,63 the Supreme Court adopted this
"private person" test to distinguish between sovereign and
commercial acts. In Weltover, the Argentinean government
unilaterally extended the repayment period for debt owed to two
Panamanian corporations and a Swiss bank.(' The creditors filed
suit in New York Federal District Court for breach of contract.
65
Argentina argued that it was immune under the FSIA. The
creditors claimed that Argentina's actions fell within the commer-
cial activity exception. 6
The Court, noting the lack of guidance from Congress in
defining commercial activity under the FSIA, stated that courts
should look to caselaw applying the restrictive theory of foreign
sovereign immunity. The Court reasoned that definitions of
sovereign immunity used by courts that have applied the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity probably reflect Congress' under-
58. Greener, supra note 55, at 199 (noting that there is authority supporting the idea
that military activity does not merit automatic immunity).
59. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1131; see also Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the
"Sovereign" Out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the
Commercial Activity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L 489,500 (1992). Donoghue notes that
Second Circuit Judge Kaufman "relied on the House Report, which defined a commercial
activity as one of the same character as might be made by a private person." Id. at 500
n.52. Donoghue also argues that there are serious flaws in using the "private person test"
to determine commercial acts. Id
60. 647 F.2d. 300, 309 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
61. Id at 306
62. Id at 310.
63. 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
64. Id at 2165.
65. Id at 2164.
66. Id at 2165.
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standing of sovereign immunity because Congress was trying to
codify the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity.67
Citing Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba,68 a case that
applied the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity, the
Court in Weltover concluded that a sovereign's acts should be
characterized as commercial activity if that particular act is some-
thing in which private parties can also engage.69 The Court stated
that "a foreign state engaging in 'commercial activities' do[es] not
exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns; rather, it exercise[s] only
those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens." '7
Thus, where a private person is able to engage in similar activity,
it is not peculiar to sovereigns, and sovereign immunity is extin-
guished.
2. Action "Based on" the Particular Commercial Activity
The second requirement necessary to strip a foreign sovereign
of immunity-action "based on" the particular commercial activi-
ty-focuses on the commercial activity and its relationship to the
cause of action. The defendant must show some relationship
between the commercial activity and the cause of action to satisfy
this requirement. The key question, however, is the extent of the
relationship necessary to satisfy this requirement. For example,
would an accident in a meat factory owned and operated by a
foreign government be sufficiently related to the commercial
activity for the government to lose its immunity? Or is a closer
relationship between the activity and the cause of action neces-
sary? Because Congress gave little guidance for determining the
type of relationship necessary to satisfy this requirement, a wide
variety of tests has been developed.7'
In Gibbons v. Udaras,7 the New York District Court consid-
ered the "literal test." This test employs a literal reading of the
"based upon" requirement and requires that the cause of action be
67. Id.
68. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
69. Argentina v. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (1992).
70. Id
71. Greener, supra note 55, at 182.
72. 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that subject matter jurisdiction existed
under the commercial activities exception of the FSIA for two U.S. citizens suing the
Republic of Ireland for breach of contract, fraud, tortious interference with contractual
relations, and a taking of property).
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based directly on the defendant's commercial activities in the
United States.7 3 In Gibbons, the court rejected this test, however,
and it has not gained much acceptance.74
In Sugarman v. Aeromexico, 5 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals adopted a "nexus test." This test requires only "some
connection between the plaintiff's grievance and the foreign
entity's commercial activity in the United States."76  This ap-
proach has gained some acceptance and is regarded by other
courts as a "more effective way of carrying out the goal of
requiring a connection between the lawsuit and the United
States.
The "causal connection test," adopted by the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals in Gilson v. Ireland,78 states that the "standard
is met if the plaintiff can show a causal connection between the
foreign state's commercial activity and the plaintiff's cause of
action or an element in the cause of action [and seems to] fall
between the literal test and the nexus test."79 The Fifth Circuit
rejected this test as "requiring a tighter connection between the
United States and the lawsuit in question" than is necessary,
however. 'o
The "doing business test" focuses on the connection between
the defendant and the United States.8' This test was applied by
the District Court for the Southern District of New York in In re
Rio Grande Transport.82 The "doing business test" requires "no
specific connection between the lawsuit and the United States...
it is only necessary that the broad course of conduct be connected
73. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1132; see also Gibbons v. Udaras, 549 F. Supp. 1094,
1109 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
74. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1132.
75. 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980) (denying immunity to a national airline of Mexico for
tortious injury suffered by passenger in a Mexican airport as he was waiting for a delayed
flight to New York City).
76. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1132; see also Sugarman v. Aeromexico, 626 F. 2d 270,
272-73 (3d Cir. 1980).
77. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1132.
78. 682 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (denying immunity to Republic of Ireland for
commercial misdeeds under the FSIA).
79. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1133; see also Gilson v. Ireland, 682 F.2d at 1027-28.
80. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1133.
81. Id at 1133-34.
82. In re Rio Grande Transport, 516 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (denying immunity
to Algerian shipping company in suit for damages due to a collision in the Mediterranean
Sea).
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to the United States." 3 This position, however, seems to
eliminate the "based upon" requirement and may contradict
Congressional intent. 4 Like the "Literal Test," however, the
"doing business test" has not gained much acceptance.
8 5
The "jurisdictional nexus test," the most widely used test,
requires "a bond or link that connects the foreign state to the
wrongful act, for which it is sought to be held liable and is
comparable to the requirement that there be a causal connection
in order to impose liability in the civil law of torts." 6  The
"jurisdictional nexus test" has also been expressed as a nexus
between the plaintiff's grievance and the sovereign's commercial
activity' s
Finally, the Supreme Court adopted a more stringent "based
on" requirement. In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,ss the Supreme
Court required the relationship between the commercial activity
and the cause of action to be more than a mere connection.8"
Although the Court suggests that every element of a claim does
not have to be a commercial activity,' it is clear that this is
preferable to the Court.91 This more stringent requirement,
however, appears to apply only in connection with the first clause
of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), 2 which describes one of the three
nexus requirements.' Justice Souter justified this more stringent
83. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1134.
84. it.
85. Id
86. Id. at 1134-35.
87. Id.
88. 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
89. I& at 1478.
90. Id. at 1478 n.4.
91. Analogizing to tort law, it seems that the Court was not satisfied with a mere "but
for" causal relationship between the commercial activity and the cause of action, but
instead required something like "proximate causation." One commentator argued that the
Supreme Court requires the commercial activity to actually inflict the injury, which is more
analogous to "direct causation." See Deirdre E. Whelan, The Commercial Activity
Exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 27
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1069, 1094 (1994).
92. Clause one of § 1605(a)(2) states that: "a foreign state is not immune from
jurisdiction.., in any case in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
93. All three elements-the nexus requirement, characterization of the activity as
commercial in nature, and satisfaction of the "based on" requirement-are necessary for
the commercial activity exception to strip a foreign sovereign of immunity. See supra notes
51-53 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 97-122 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the nexus requirement.
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"based on" requirement for the first clause of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2) by arguing that the first clause was worded differently
than the other two clauses.' Souter noted that the "in connec-
tion" wording, found in the second and third clauses of §
1605(a)(2), was absent from the first clause.95 He then argued
that "distinctions among descriptions juxtaposed against each other
are naturally understood to be significant. ' 6 From this analysis,
Souter concluded that "the only reasonable reading of the former
term calls for something more than a mere connection with, or
relation to, commercial activity. '
3. Finding a Nexus Between the Commercial Activity and the
United States
The third element necessary to strip sovereign immunity from
a foreign sovereign is the nexus requirement. The nexus required
between the commercial activity and the United States is similar
to the "based on" requirement. In both instances, a relationship
is required to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over the claim.
Whereas the "based on" requirement focuses on the relationship
between the cause of action and the commercial activity, the nexus
requirement focuses on the relationship between the commercial
activity and the United States.
There are three situations, described in 28 U.S.C. § 1605,
when a foreign state's "commercial activity" satisfies the required
nexus with the United States. A nation would lose its sovereign
immunity if (1) the "action is based on a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign nation,"'9 (2) the
action is based upon an "act performed in the Untied States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state el-
sewhere,"" or (3) the action is based upon an act outside U.S.
94. Clauses two and three of § 1605(a)(2) state that:
foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States in which the action is based upon an act performed in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or based
upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States.
95. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1477 (1993)
96. Id.
97. 1d.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
99. Id.
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territory in connection with commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere that causes a direct effect in the United States.
1°°
Each situation varies slightly, as illustrated below.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e), the first situation0 1 that satisfies
the nexus requirement is "a commercial activity carried on by a
foreign state ... and having substantial contact with the United
States.' ' 1°" Legislative history further clarifies this section:
[a] commercial activity carried on in the United States ...
would include not only a commercial transaction performed and
executed in its entirety in the United States, but also a commer-
cial transaction or act having a "substantial contact" with the
United States ... [and] includes cases based on commercial
transactions performed in whole or in part in the United States,
import-export transactions involving sales to, or purchases from,
concerns in the United States, business torts occurring in the
United States, ... and an indebtedness incurred by a foreign
state which negotiates or executes a loan agreement in theUnited States.0 3
For example, a plaintiff's breach of contract action against
Colombia based upon a sale of coffee beans in the United States
should satisfy this requirement. Moreover, a plaintiff's action for
a breach of contract against Colombia based upon a sale of coffee
beans to American traders, who pick up the beans in Colombia,
might also satisfy this requirement because the transaction does
not have to occur entirely in the United States. The nexus
requirement is satisfied as long as there is some "substantial
contact" with the United States.
The second situation that satisfies the nexus requirement is
when the action is based upon an "act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere."" This situation focuses on specific "conduct of the
foreign state in the United States which relates either to a regular
course of commercial conduct elsewhere or to a particular
commercial transaction" conducted elsewhere. 5 Congress also
100. lit
101. The first situation is a commercial activity carried on in the United States by a
foreign government. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
102. Id. § 1603(e).
103. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 38, at 6615-16.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988).
105. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 38, at 6617.
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notes that there might be overlap between the first and second
situations. 1 6  Nevertheless, Congress concludes that "it ...
seem[s] advisable to provide expressly for the case where a claim
arises out of a specific act in the United States which is commer-
cial or private in nature and which relates to a commercial activity
abroad."10 7
In Gilson v. Ireland," the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
denied immunity to Ireland. The court ruled that enticing an
American plaintiff to move his family, equipment, and technology
to Ireland for the purpose of developing some quartz crystals and
then breaching the employment contract was an act performed in
the United States in connection with commercial activity per-
formed elsewhere.1°9
Other examples of this second situation which would be
sufficient to deny immunity include an "act in the United States
that violates U.S. securities laws or regulations; [and] the wrongful
discharge in the United States of an employee of the foreign state
who has been employed in connection with a commercial activity
carried on in some third country." ' °
The third situation that satisfies the nexus requirement is
when a law suit is based upon "an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States." ' The key to this test is finding the direct effect in the
United States.
Legislative history suggests that Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law112 should be used in defining direct
effect. 13 Section 18 of this Restatement, addressing the applica-
tion of U.S. laws to foreign activity, states that the "effect within
the territory [should be] substantial ... and [a] foreseeable result
of the conduct outside the territory. 1 14  This interpretation of
106. Id at 6618.
107. Id
108. 682 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1982), on remand, 606 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd,
787 F.2d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
109. Id. at 1026-27.
110. H.R. REP. NO. 1487, supra note 38, at 6617-18.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 18(b)(ii)-(iii) (1965).
113. H.R. REP. NO. 1487, supra note 38, at 6618.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 18(b)(ii)-(iii) (1965).
See also Callejo v. Bancomer. S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th. Cir. 1985); Greener, supra
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direct effect is acepted by the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth,
and D.C. Circuits.1 5  The Second Circuit, however, has "consis-
tently held that courts need not be restrained by the Act's
legislative history.,
116
Determining the precise scope of the substantial and
foreseeable effect standard is difficult, however, and, according to
one judge, is "an enterprise fraught with artifice.""1 7 Although
it is clear that mere contact with the United States as a result of
U.S. citizenship or U.S. residency is not enough,1 the precise
scope of the substantial and foreseeable effect standard remains
unclear. A D.C. circuit court found a substantial and foreseeable
effect when the United States detained a foreign ship for the
purpose of demanding payment. 9 Other courts have rejected
a substantial and foreseeable effect argument when a U.S.
corporation suffered a mere financial loss" and when a murder
in a foreign country injured a victim's relatives in the United
States.12'
In addition to having a substantial and foreseeable effect, the
effect must also happen "in" the United States to satisfy the third
nexus requirement.' 2 Courts define an effect happening "in" the
United States as "where the legally significant acts giving rise to
note 55, at 184.
115. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1139 n.144; see also America West Airlines, Inc. v.
GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793,798 (9th Cir. 1989); Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical
Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 877 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992);
Zedan v. Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Zernicek v. Brown & Root, Inc.,
826 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988); Harris Corp. v. National
Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Texas Trading &
Milling Corp. v. Nigeria, 64 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 114 (1982)).
116. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1139. See also International Hous. Ltd. v. Rafidain
Bank Iraq, 893 F.2d 8, 11 n.2 (2d Cir. 1989); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Nigeria, 647
F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 114 (1982); Martian v. South Africa, 836 F.2d
91 (2d Cir. 1987).
117. See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th. Cir. 1988) (quoting Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
114 (1982)).
118. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1139; see also H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 38, at
6616.
119. Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
120. Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1526-27 (9th Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 493 U.S.
891 (1989).
121. Berkovitz v. Iran, 735 F.2d 329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1035 (1984).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
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the claim occurred [in the United States]." 1" For example, if a
U.S. shareholder is injured by fraudulent transactions between a
foreign state and a U.S. corporation doing business in the foreign
state, the nexus requirement would be met because the significant
act giving rise to the claim is the ownership of the stocks in the
United States.
Combining all of these requirements, an example of a
situation in which a foreign state could lose its immunity under the
third nexus requirement might be where a person, who depends on
his reputation to make money, suffers considerable monetary
injuries by losing a very high paid job because of a loss of
reputation. A person's reputation could be damaged if a popular,
state-owned newspaper with world-wide circulation printed-at the
state's direction-a false article accusing that person of molesting
several children in that foreign country. The commercial activity
in the foreign country is printing, selling, and distributing newspa-
pers to the United States. The effect is foreseeable because such
defamatory remarks, if untrue, would foreseeably cause serious
harm to people who depend on their reputations to make money.
The harm is substantial because the person in the United States
will lose a high paying job and may be hindered from working in
the future. Finally, the legally significant act giving rise to the
claim is the distribution of the paper in the United States, giving
the person a cause of action for defamation under U.S. law.
IV. CiCIPPio v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
A. Procedural Background
After his release on December 2, 1991, Joseph J. Cicippio,
along with his wife and another former hostage, David Jacobsen,
filed suit in a U.S. district court, seeking $600,000,000 in Iranian
frozen assets to compensate for injuries suffered due to the
kidnapping. 24 The complaint alleged that Iran promoted, con-
trolled, financed, and directed the kidnapping of Cicippio and
Jacobsen in an attempt to force the United States to release frozen
assets. 25 The plaintiffs claimed damages for false imprisonment,
123. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1140; see also Zedan v. Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511,
1515 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
124. 2 Ex-Hostages Sue Iran for $600 Million, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1992, at A16.
125. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1141.
1995]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 17:701
kidnapping, physical abuse, inhumane medical treatment, loss of
job opportunities, and pain and suffering.126
Iran moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of federal subject
matter jurisdiction. 27  Cicippio argued that subject matter
jurisdiction was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), by
which foreign sovereigns waive their immunity from suit,
§ 1605(a)(2), which exempts commercial activities from subject
matter jurisdiction, and § 1605(a)(5), which exempts non-commer-
cial tortious acts or omissions causing personal injury in the United
States.1"
The district court quickly eliminated jurisdictional bases under
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) 29 and § 1605(a)(5),13° based on the
Supreme Court's holding in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Corp."' In Amerada Hess Corp., the Supreme Court rejected
arguments under both 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) and § 1605(a)(5) that
were similar to Cicippio's arguments.132  The district court,
however, could not resolve the question of whether subject matter
jurisdiction exists under § 1605(a)(2), the commercial activities
exception. The district court briefly considered 28 U.S.C.
126. Id. at 1141 n.159.
127. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 92-2300, 1993 WL 730748 at *1 (D.D.C..
1993). The court did not consider Iran's objection to service of process and lack of
personal jurisdiction.
128. Id
129. This provision allows federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
government based on a waiver by the foreign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1988).
130. This provision allows federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
government when a non-commercial 'tortious' act or omission of the foreign state causes
personal injury or property damage in the United States. Id. § 1605(a)(5).
131. 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (holding that various international agreements did not
represent "waivers" of Argentina's right to claim immunity from suit in U.S. courts for a
military air strike that resulted in the destruction of a neutral oil tanker during the
Falkland Islands War, and rejecting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) because the
property damage did not occur in the United States, even though the tanker was heading
for the United States).
132. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 92-2300, 1993 WL 730748 at *1 (D.D.C.
1993). Cicippio argued that certain compacts and accords between Iran and the United
States waived Iran's right to claim immunity. Id The Supreme Court rejected this
proposition in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). Cicippio
also argued that the court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988), because
his damages were inflicted in the United States because he was to be released back to the
United States. Id. Amerada Hess Corp. also rejected this proposition. Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989).
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§ 1605(a)(2), clause 3,133 and concluded that a definitive resolu-
tion by an appellate court of whether hostage taking falls under
the "commercial activity" exception, within the scope of the FSIA,
was necessary. 34 Thus, the court dismissed the case on March
18, 1993.135 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
considered and rejected the argument that hostage taking falls
under the "commercial activity" exception and affirmed the district
court decision on July 29, 1994. t36  The U.S. Supreme Court
denied Cicippio's petition for writ of certiorari on January 9,
1995.37
B. The District Court Decision
The district court briefly considered the possibility of using the
commercial activity elsewhere causing a direct effect in the United
States as the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. 138  The court
recognized that trafficking captured persons,1 39 as a means of
gaining money, occurs within the international community.14
The court also suggested that it might be possible to characterize
hostage-taking for ransom as 'commercial activity' under recent
Supreme Court analysis.1 4' Nevertheless, the court concluded
that "state-supported kidnapping, hostage-taking, and similar
criminal ventures were simply not the sorts of proprietary
enterprises within the contemplation of Congress when it enacted
the 'commercial activity' exception to [the] FSIA.' 142
The court was also concerned with the implications of a
contrary holding and its effects on the scope of the FSIA, stating
133. Subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate when a lawsuit is based upon an act
outside the United States in connection with a commercial activity elsewhere and the act
causes a direct effect in the United States. See supra Part III.
134. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 92-2300, 1993 WL 730748, at *2 (D.D.C.
1993).
135. Id. at *1.
136. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 726 (1995).
137. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 115 S. Ct. 726 (1995).
138. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 92-2300, 1993 WL 730748, at *2 (D.D.C.
1993).
139. For example, using hostages to gain valuable commodities from other countries
should be considered trafficking captured persons.
140. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 92-2300, 1993 WL 730748, at *2 (D.D.C.
1993) (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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that "[t]he implications of a contrary ruling would extend far
beyond the circumstances of this case."143
C. The Court of Appeals Decision Focuses on the Definition of
Commercial Activities
The D.C. Circuit Court focused on whether Iran's alleged
activities can be considered "commercial" activities.'44 The court
of appeals concluded that Iran's alleged activities were not
"commercial" activities under the FSIA, thus affirming the lower
court decision.
1 45
The circuit court used a two step analysis to determine
whether Iran's activities were "commercial activities" under the
FSIA. The court first identified the activities that were "relevant"
to the analysis.146 The court then applied the "private person
test ' 14 7 to those "relevant" activities to determine whether those
"relevant" activities were commercial."~
1. Identifying the Relevant Acts for Analysis
Attempting to identify the relevant acts for analysis, the
appellate court noted that it was unclear as to which Iranian acts
the plaintiffs alleged were the "commercial acts" appropriate for
analysis. "We have not a little difficulty in understanding
appellants' precise theory of the case because they do not clearly
identify which of the allegations is the 'act' which make[s] up the
commercial activity.'' 149 The court was unsure whether Cicippio
claimed that kidnapping for money constituted the commercial act
or whether unfreezing the assets constituted the commercial
act.1 50 Rather than considering the entire transaction, including
the kidnapping, the demand for money, the receipt of the money,
143. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 92-2300, 1993 WL 730748, at *2 (D.D.C.
1993).
144. Under the framework established above in Part Ill.C, the court analyzed the first
of three elements necessary to find a commercial activity exception to the FSIA.
145. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
146. 1& at 166.
147. The private person test is used to determine whether activity is commercial or
sovereign in nature by asking whether a private person can engage in a similar activity.
See supra Part III.C.1.
148. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 166-67 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
149. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 92-2300, 1993 WL 730748, at *2 (D.D.C.
1993).
150. Id.
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and the release of the hostages, in analyzing the nature of the act,
the court instead focused its inquiry on whether a "foreign
sovereign's alleged use of non-official agents to conduct hostage
taking [for] economic advantages" ' can be characterized as a
commercial activity.
152
Identifying the act in this manner may be crucial to the
ultimate decision in this case, because the outcome of the "private
person test, 153 depends largely on the acts that are analyzed. 54
For example, suppose that country X agreed to allow Y, a private
person, to cut a certain number of trees from country X's land for
a fee. Y subsequently moved equipment to country X and built a
lumber factory. When country X discovered that many endan-
gered species lived among those trees, however, country X
terminated the agreement. Y filed suit against country X in a
federal court for damages due to the breach of contract. If the
court decides that the relevant act is country X's regulation or
preservation of wildlife, application of the "private person test"
will probably yield a "sovereign" activity result because regulation
of wildlife is not something within a private person's power. If the
court decides that the relevant act is country X contracting with Y
to use country X's land, however, application of the"private person
test" might yield a "commercial" activity result because contracting
for the use of another's land is within a private person's pow-
er.1
55
Thus, in the Cicippio case, the result might have been very
different had the circuit court determined that the "relevant" act
was kidnapping for ransom. If the act was so characterized, an
argument could have been made that private persons can and do
engage in this type of activity, making it a "commercial" act.
Under the circuit court's determination that the relevant act was
151. Id,
152. Id.
153. See supra note 147 for an explanation of the "private person test."
154. Donoghue, supra note 59, at 501 ("immunity of the foreign state varies according
to the court's identification of the relevant activity"); see also International Ass'n of
Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982)
(noting that a narrow or broad definition of the relevant activity may determine the
immunity question).,
155. One commentator identified this problem as a serious shortcoming for the "private
person test." "[B]oth the first and the second steps in this analysis [are] flawed, and cases
applying the [private person test] reach conflicting and unpredictable results." Donoghue,
supra note 59, at 501.
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Iran's alleged use of non-official agents to conduct hostage taking,
it is much more difficult to make the argument that a private
person can engage in this type of activity.
2. Analysis of the Circuit Court's Identification of the Relevant
Act
Because the result of the "private person test," and the
eventual determination of sovereign immunity, depends largely on
the identification of the relevant act,"6 whether or not the circuit
court's selection of the "relevant" acts is correct in this case is
important to the understanding of the circuit court's decision. A
court's only restriction in selecting the "relevant" act is the
statutory command of 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d), which requires that a
court only consider the "nature" of the activity.
157
In the Cicippio case, the nature of the activity could be
described as "hostage-taking for economic gain." Essentially, Iran
kidnapped Cicippio to coerce the United States to release assets
frozen in the United States to Iran. While the circuit court's
identification of the "nature" of the act seems to be similar to
"hostage-taking for economic gain," they added "a foreign
sovereign's alleged use of non-official agents to conduct" to the
basic definition of hostage-taking for economic gain. This addition
is unnecessary because the type of actor that conducts the activity
is not relevant in determining the nature of the activity. Further-
more, the addition goes beyond the scope of considering only the
nature of the activity. By considering the type of actor conducting
the activity, the court's focus is no longer just on the essence of the
activity in its isolated form. This seems to violate the command of
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) to focus only on the "nature" of the activity.
A contrived selection of the relevant act allows the circuit court to
manipulate the outcome of the "private person test."
156. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
157. "[T]he commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act rather than by reference
to its purpose." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988). See supra note 65 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the difference between nature and purpose; see also Cicippio v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (recognizing the nature and purpose
distinction as a limitation of what it could consider).
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3. The Court of Appeals' Adoption and Application of the
Private Person Test
The circuit court recognized that, under Argentina v. Weltover,
Inc.,5 s the accepted test to distinguish a commercial activity from
a sovereign activity is whether the government activity is one in
which commercial actors typically engage for trade and traffic or
commerce.159 This is essentially the private person test. If the
government activity is not an act typically engaged in for trade or
commerce by private actors, the government activity is considered
a sovereign act.
Complications arise, however, when the activity is illegal.
Theoretically, all private parties are not permitted to engage in
illegal activities because all such actions are prohibited by law.
Thus, strict adherence to the Weltover test requires a grant of
immunity to all sovereign actors who engage in illegal activity
because private parties are not able to engage in illegal activities
such as kidnapping and fraud.
a. The Second Circuit Approach
The Second Circuit has demonstrated strict adherence to the
Weltover test by granting immunity to foreign sovereigns who
engage in illegal activity." In Letelier v. Chile,6' the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that "kidnapping and assassinations
could not be considered commercial activities under FSIA because
a private person could not engage in such activity lawfully."' 62
This rather simplistic approach, however, is nonsensical.
Because all tortious acts are in one way or another unlawful,1 63
under the Second Circuit approach, all foreign tortious actors
enjoy immunity under the FSIA because their acts cannot lawfully
be done by private individuals. The FSIA could not possibly
contemplate granting immunity to all foreign sovereigns who
engage in some form of tortious act. Because many cases brought
against foreign sovereigns involve some sort of tort liability,
158. 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
159. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
160. Letelier v. Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 797 (2d Cir. 1984).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Tortious acts are unlawful in the sense that persons who commit such acts are
subject to liability under tort law.
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adherence to the Second Circuit's rule would nearly eliminate the
exception.
b. The US. Supreme Court Approach: Character of Perpetrator
Test
The D.C. Circuit noted the weakness of the Second Circuit's
categorical rule, stating that the U.S. Supreme Court declined an
opportunity to apply the Second Circuit rule in a recent case."
In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,165 the plaintiff, an American hired in
the United States to work in Saudi Arabia, claimed that he was
wrongly imprisoned and tortured by Saudi police. 66 Because the
imprisonment and torturing of Nelson constitute illegal actions that
cannot be done by private persons, the Supreme Court could have
sustained the immunity for Saudi Arabia under the Second Circuit
rule. Even though it was "the most obvious line of analysis," 67
however, the Supreme Court did not use the Second Circuit's
approach. The Supreme Court appeared to ignore the illegality
problem and instead proceeded to use the Weltover analysis,
regardless of the legality or illegality of the action. The Court
concluded that the sovereign activity could not be considered
commercial because private parties could not exercise the police
power used to capture and torture Nelson. "[P]rivate parties
cannot exercise that 'sort' of power while engaging in commerce
[thus] the activity could not be thought 'commercial."" '
In Nelson, the Supreme Court seemed to focus on the status
of the perpetrators, whether they are sovereign or non-sovereign
in nature, to determine whether private parties can conduct this
type of activity. Because the Court focused on the perpetrator's
status, the door is open for the argument that such government
activity could fall under the commercial activity exception when
the perpetrators are not sovereign in nature. This argument might
succeed because private parties could hire other private parties to
conduct this type of illegal action, thus meeting the private person
test. In the Nelson case, for example, if the government had hired
private persons to detain and beat Nelson, instead of using police
164. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 166-67 (D.C. Cir 1994).
165. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
166. Id.
167. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing
the finding in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993)).
168. Id.
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to do so, the result should be different under the Nelson analysis.
Because the perpetrator's status in this hypothetical would be "a
private actor" and not "a public actor," it is no longer a sovereign
act.
Cicippio made this argument, but it was rejected by the D.C.
Circuit Court.169 While the circuit court conceded that this is a
valid argument under Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, the court maintained
that acceptance of this argument contradicts congressional
intent.17 ° The court argued that "to accept appellants' claim
would be to declare that all such acts, regardless of context,
sponsored openly or covertly by a sovereign power are outside the
immunity granted by the FSIA, unless conducted directly... [by]
government officials, ... we think that cannot be what Congress
intended." '171 The court cited no support for this assertion,
merely reasoning that Cicippio's interpretation would lead to a
conclusion unintended by Congress when fashioning the FSIA.
72
c. Adopting the Commercial Context Requirement
Although the D.C. Circuit Court agreed that the activity's
illegal character is irrelevant in determining whether the activity is
commercial in nature, and that Cicippio's argument was not
precluded by Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 73 the court refused to
conclude that the commercial activity exception strips sovereign
immunity from a foreign nation whenever a sovereign hires a
private party to engage in what would usually be considered
sovereign acts. It appears that the court felt compelled to avoid
this conclusion, but lacked some analytic tool to do so.
In order to avoid concluding that the commercial activities
exception strips sovereign immunity from a foreign nation whenev-
er a sovereign hires a private party to engage in sovereign acts, the
D.C. Circuit Court ddopted the commercial context requirement.
The court argued that it must first determine that the sovereign act
was conducted in a commercial context 74 in order to more
169. Id. at 167-68.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
173. 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993); see also discussion supra Part IV.C.2.b.
174. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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accurately judge the commercial nature of an act when applying
the Weltover test.'75
Although the purpose and perhaps the illegal character of the
alleged acts are irrelevant in judging their commercial character,
... the context in which the acts take place must be germane.
Unless an act takes place in a commercial context, it would be
impossible to determine whether it is conducted in the manner
of a private player in the market.176
The court justified this additional requirement by arguing that
the alternative conclusion-stripping away sovereign immunity
whenever a state hires a private party to engage in the state's
acts-could not be what Congress intended when it fashioned the
commercial activity exception.177 The court cited no evidence of
congressional intent on this issue, however.
Thus, the D.C. Circuit Court's interpretation of the definition
of a "commercial activity" depends on the circumstances giving
rise to a claim or the context in which the claim arises; such
circumstances or context must be commercial in nature.178 For
example, this requirement was satisfied in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson
because the context or circumstances giving rise to the claim
involved Nelson's employment in a hospital. In contrast, this
requirement was not satisfied in the Cicippio case because the use
of non-official agents to gain economic advantages for Iran
through hostage-taking did not arise out of a commercial context.
Presumably, using non-official agents to conduct hostage-taking, to
gain some kind of business advantage for a state-owned business,
satisfies the commercial context requirement because such an act
occurs in, or arises out of, a commercial context.
The court explained that this distinction is acceptable because
the latter situation is a commercial activity, not because the
hostage is being exchanged for some commercial commodity, such
as money or other business advantage, but because it takes place
in the commercial context. The court is concerned with converting
acts that are normally non-commercial, such as murder, into
175. The Weltover test is used to determine whether a sovereign act may be character-
ized as a commercial act and is essentially the same as the "private person test." See supra
notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
176. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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commercial acts simply by showing that the murderer was paid to
commit the murder.
V. ANALYSIS/CRITICISM OF THE "COMMERCIAL CONTEXT"
REQUIREMENT
The court's reliance on the commerical context requirement
is problematic because: (1) it appears to violate the congressional
prohibition against considering "purpose" when judging an
activity's commercial nature; (2) it fails to give clear definitions for
the term "commercial context"; and (3) it embodies political
considerations in the determination of immunity, which is a mode
of analysis Congress clearly wanted to steer away from with the
enactment of the FSIA. Each criticism will be individually
discussed below.
A. The Context Requirement and the "Purpose" Clause
The first problem with the context requirement is the specific
congressional prohibition against considering "purpose" when
judging an activity's commercial character."8 Considering an
activity's commercial context is really just a euphemism for
considering its purpose. The focus is on why the activity takes
place, not just on what activity takes place. In Cicippio, for
example, the circuit court's whole argument depended on the fact
that the kidnapping occurred because Iran was trying to coerce the
United States into releasing money, not because a private company
was trying to coerce a competitor into giving up some business
advantage."81 A focus on why the activity occurs ignores the
distinction between purpose and nature and clearly violates the
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1603, which specifically provides that "the
commercial activity shall be determined by reference to the nature
of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather
than by reference to its purpose."1"
179. Id.
180. Statutory language in 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1988) specifically prohibits consideration
of purpose when determining whether a certain activity is commercial.
181. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The court
suggested that a kidnapping in a commercial context could be considered a commercial
activity: "perhaps a kidnapping of a commercial rival could be thought to be a commercial
activity." Id.
182. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
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The circuit court recognized this problem and attempted to
avoid it by arguing that this provision "prevent[s] the foreign
sovereign from casting a governmental purpose, which always can
be found, as a cloak of protection over typical commercial activi-
ties."183 In other words, this provision attempts to prevent the
foreign sovereign from evading commercial contracts simply by
claiming that they were made for a governmental purpose, which
would allow the foreign sovereign to immunize itself from U.S.
jurisdiction. Thus, the court argued that the purpose/nature
distinction only applies if invoked to prevent a government from
avoiding commercial contracts.l4
Although it is probably true that the "purpose" provision's
main objective is to prevent the sovereign from hiding behind
sovereign immunity to escape contractual liabilities, whether
Congress may have constructed this provision for other reasons is
unclear. Because the legislative history does not clearly state the
"purpose" provision's objective, other objectives are not precluded.
Furthermore, Congress' command to avoid consideration of
purpose is clearly expressed without limitations on its opera-
tion.
l1 5
One could argue, however, that the purpose provision was not
intended to completely bar a court from considering purpose when
evaluating the character of a sovereign's activity, because Congress
specifically gave wide latitude for the courts to define commercial
activity. "The courts would have a great deal of latitude in
determining what is a commercial activity... it seems unwise to
attempt an excessively precise definition of this term. 18 6 This
argument is especially true when one considers the difficulty of
separating the nature and the purpose of a given activity. The
Fifth Circuit Court commented on this difficulty in DeSanchez v.
Banco Central de Nicaragua."l The court held that the problems
with separating purpose and nature would force the court to
consider the purposes of certain activities." "Commercial acts
themselves are often defined by reference to their purpose. What
makes these acts commercial is not some ethereal essence inherent
183. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
184. Id.
185. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
186. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 38, at 6605.
187. 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
188. Id. at 1385-86.
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in the conduct itself, but generally because they are engaged in...
for a profit.,
189
Despite such difficulty, the D.C. Circuit's justification for
refusing to follow the statutory command to avoid purpose analysis
is unpersuasive. The court's justification for deviation is based not
on confusion or an inability to differentiate between purpose and
nature, but instead is based on avoiding a certain result that strikes
discord with the court. Any issue involving statutory interpreta-
tion begins with the premise that the ordinary meaning of the
language of the statute is to be used.1' 9 Further, when the
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed language. 91 In Cicippio,
the statutory language clearly states that "purpose" is not to be
considered.1" Thus, the circuit court's adoption of the commer-
cial context requirement is clearly erroneous.
In addition, the commercial context requirement was argued
and implicitly rejected in the Weltover case by the U.S. Supreme
Court. The Petitioner's Brief to the Supreme Court argues that
the commercial context should properly be used in order to
determine the nature of the activity." The Respondent's Brief
argues that the commercial context requirement is equivalent to
consideration of purpose, in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1603.194 The
issue was also argued before the Supreme Court during oral
argument.195  The Court implicitly rejected the commercial
context requirement. The Court noted that "although the FSIA
bars consideration of 'purpose,' a court must nonetheless fully
consider the context of a transaction."" Implicit in this state-
ment is the Court's acknowledgement that considering context is
equivalent to considering purpose. If purpose is not the same as
context, the Court would not have written "nonetheless fully
189. Wuebbels, supra note 6, at 1130 n.71.
190. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 187 (1991).
191. Mobil Oil Exploration v. United Distribution Co., 498 U.S. 211, 222 (1991).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
193. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 17-24, Argentina v. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. 2160 (No.
91-763) (1992).
194. Respondent's Brief at 8-11, Argentina v. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. 2160 (No. 91-763)
(1992).
195. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript (Oral Argument) at 21-24,
Argentina v. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. 2160 (No. 91-763), available in Westlaw, SCr-
ORALARG Database.
196. Argentina v. weltover, 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2167 (1992) (emphasis added).
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consider the context . . . ."97 The term "nonetheless" suggests
that if context is considered it would violate the FSIA bar against
consideration of purpose. The Supreme Court ultimately decided
not to use petitioner's context analysis and denied immunity to
petitioner.198
B. Problems Regarding the Definition of Commercial Context
Another problem with the commercial context requirement,
as a prerequisite to determining when a commercial activity exists,
is one of definition. The circuit court fails to give clear guidance
regarding how the set of acts or surrounding circumstances that
make up the particular activity's context should be determined.
For example, whether courts should consider all acts and surround-
ing circumstances that contribute to the particular activity or only
consider the pertinent acts or surrounding circumstances that
strongly contribute to a particular activity is unclear. The court
does not limit what may be considered.
Further, problems could arise when the particular activity
arises out of both a commercial and a non-commercial context.
Presumably, there are activities that are commercial in nature but
are conducted in both commercial and non-commercial contexts;
those activities should fall under the commercial activities
exception. This additional "context" requirement creates more
confusion because it is unclear which "context" to use in this
situation. For example, if the Iranian government refused to
honor a contract to pay an individual in the United States to
rescue officers of a very powerful corporation, in which the
government of Iran is a partner, who are being held hostage in
Iraq, it is arguable that this transaction happens in both a commer-
cial context, because of the contract to pay and because a foreign
corporation is involved, and a non-commercial context, because the
foreign sovereign hired another to rescue hostages. It is unclear
how the court will deal with this situation or which "context"
should be used to determine whether the situation falls under the
commercial activity exception. This example shows that the
context requirement is not helpful in analyzing certain situations,
and even further confounds analysis.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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C. Political Concerns Behind the New Requirement
It is clear that concern for international politics constituted at
least part of the basis for the D.C. Circuit Court's decision in
Cicippio, because the court went out of its way to find a new
requirement to block jurisdiction, justifying its decision on a vague,
uncitable notion of congressional intent. Perhaps the D.C. Circuit
Court judge was concerned with the decision's effects on interna-
tional relations with Iran or the possibility of reciprocal revocation
of immunity in Iranian courts. Whatever the concern, this new
requirement clearly embodies the policy of restricting federal
courts' subject matter jurisdiction in adjudicating international
disputes, by adding another barrier to obtaining subject matter
jurisdiction.
It is interesting to note, however, that aversion to this type of
"political" consideration was one of the reasons the FSIA was
enacted in the first place.199 "It was clear that the central struc-
tural purpose was separation of the judicial and executive powers
in international cases."'' Prior to the enactment of the FSIA,
decisions regarding sovereign immunity were delegated to the
State Department.2 1 This delegation of authority resulted in
severe criticism charging that the "Department's internal methods
were deficient; suggestions of immunity were thought to be issued
in accordance with political expediency, without regard for
consistency and principle."'" 2
Furthermore, because of the State Department's influence in
other areas of international relations, there was a "natural
inclination to exert its influence [in the area of foreign immunity]
for political ends; [consequently] sovereign immunity increasingly
became an instrument of foreign policy."' Congress sought an
end to political considerations through enactment of the FSIA,
explaining "that the purpose was to excise foreign policy consider-
ations from the courts' consideration of sovereign immunity issues,
and to depoliticize immunity decisions by vesting them exclusively
199. Jack Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy-Making in International Civil Litigation:
Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 461, 462-68
(1993); see also Hill, supra note 19, at 173-78.
200. Garvey, supra note 199, at 462.
201. See supra Parts II.B and III.A.
202. Hill, supra note 19, at 175.
203. Id. at 178.
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in the courts operating within the limitations of defined, objective
legal criteria."m
Scholars have recognized, however, that the evils of political
considerations2°5 in the immunity decision may still lurk, even
when determination of foreign sovereign immunity is taken from
the executive branch and transferred to the judiciary. The
argument is that political considerations creep back into the
analysis through subtle manipulations by judges "to accommodate
their personal perceptions of foreign relations."2' Furthermore,
it has been noted that judges commonly use the commercial
activity exception as a device for such subtle manipulations.
2°7
The commercial/public act distinction could become a device for
concealing political evaluations in politically charged cases. In
practical effect, [Congress] substituted ... the direct pressure
from foreign governments and the State Department [on
immunity decisions], [for a more] subtle and deceptive means by
which the courts' own consideration of foreign policy would
control [immunity decisions]. 2"a
The manifestation of this type of subtle manipulation may
explain the D.C. Circuit Court's decision in this case. This case
was highly publicized and politically charged.2' The court
cleverly concocted a confusion regarding which acts made up the
"commercial activity., 210 The selection of the act to be consid-
ered as a commercial activity has been recognized as a principle
method used by judges to manipulate the granting of sovereign
immunity.211 "Manipulation occurs through judicial selection of
which acts, in the collection of identifiable acts upon which the
action is based, will be used to characterize the action as commer-
cial or non-commercial.,
212
Finally, the court reached too far to find a new commercial
context requirement to deny subject matter jurisdiction, when the
204. Garvey, supra note 199, at 462.
205. Evils of political considerations may include inconsistent, unprincipled, unpredict-
able results in granting sovereign immunity.
206. Garvey, supra note 199, at 463.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. The court itself noted the well-publicized nature of the case; see Cicippio v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
210. See supra Part V.C.1.
211. Garvey, supra note 199 at 463.
212. Id.
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court itself recognized that accepting jurisdiction would be consis-
tent with the most recent Supreme Court decision, Saudi Arabia
v. Nelson.213 Such private political considerations contradict the
purpose of the FSIA and reduce foreign sovereign immunity
analysis to a court's speculation on the political impact of the
decision to grant or deny. immunity.
VI. CRITICISM OF THE CicIPPio DECISION TO GRANT
IMMUNITY TO IRAN
A. Policy Reasons for Not Granting Immunity
At the heart of deciding whether to grant or deny foreign
sovereign immunity is the balance of two competing interests: (1)
the private interest of individuals in having their claims against the
foreign state adjudicated; and (2) the need for mutual protection
of governments, both foreign and domestic, from harassing
litigation.214 As one competing interest becomes more important
than the other, the granting or denying of immunity changes.
215
For example, as more individuals contract with foreign states and
depend on these contracts to conduct business, it becomes more
likely that states will develop rules that except this type of activity
from immunity. The commercial activity exception can be seen as
a manifestation of this type of analysis.
In the context of the Cicippio case, there is a strong private
interest in having Cicippio's case against Iran adjudicated. Kidnap-
ping and torture are serious violations of human rights and
breaches of international law,216 for which Cicippio suffered
considerable damages. Additionally, the chances of finding an
213. See supra Part V.C.2.b-c for a discussion of Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct.
1471 (1993).
214. Hill, supra note 19, at 165. Hill noted that, although the major policy underlying
foreign sovereign immunity, when this concept first developed, was equality and mutual
respect among nations, scholars have recently noted that such underlying policy no longer
drives modern foreign sovereign immunity. ld The current policy driving foreign
sovereign immunity is the mutual protection of essential governmental functions from
harassing and interfering litigation. Id See also Comment, Judicial Adoption of Restrictive
Immunity or Foreign Sovereigns, 51 VA. L. REv. 316, 321-24 (1965); W. Friedmann, Some
Impacts of Social Organization on International Law, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 475 (1956).
215. Hill, supra note 19, at 172.
216. The right to be free from official torture is considered a norm of jus cogens which
are considered the highest form of international law. Christopher W. Haffke, The Torture
Victim Protection Ac" More Symbol Than Substance, 43 EMORY U. 1467, 1478 (1994).
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alternate forum for a fair trial are slim. Surely, the case could not
be fairly adjudicated in Iran. The type of loss that Cicippio
suffered is clearly more important than any economic loss suffered
by a breach of contract, for which an exception to immunity is
clearly granted under FSIA. Finally, deterring this type of activity
is far more important than deterring a foreign country from
breaching its business contracts. Thus, the individual interest in
adjudicating this claim far outweighs the need to mutually protect
the governments from harassing lawsuits.
B. Granting Immunity in Light of the Torture Victim Protection
Act ("TVPA ")
2 17
Granting immunity to Iran under the FSIA also appears to
contradict Congress' recent efforts to give victims of torture a
chance to present their claims. The TVPA was passed in March
1992, creating a cause of action for acts of torture occurring
outside of U.S. territory.218 This statute was enacted in response
to an "international outcry for all nations to take affirmative
measures to end the practice of torture." '219 The TVPA has also
been recognized as a symbol of the United States' "unequivocal
contempt for torture."" Given this recent enactment, it is clear
that Congress would agree with an expansion of the FSIA to cover
torture victims like Cicippio.
C. How the Circuit Court Could Have Denied Immunity to Iran
in the Cicippio Case
Under the current analysis, the circuit court could have held
that kidnapping hostages in exchange for money falls under the
commercial activities exception. Using the Weltover test, the court
could have held that kidnapping is not an activity solely reserved
for sovereigns, because private parties can also engage in kidnap-
ping hostages, and thus kidnapping hostages for money is a
217. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993).
218. Haffke, supra note 216, at 1471 (providing a critical analysis of the TVPA). See
Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993).
219. Haffke, supra note 216, at 1471.
220. Id at 1472 (concluding that the TVPA is merely symbolic of the U.S. position
against torture and really does not permit more than what is already permitted under
existing statutes).
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commercial activity for the purposes of the FSIA. Further,
consistent with Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, as long as the sovereign
itself is not engaged in this type of activity, kidnapping hostages
for money can be considered a commercial activity for the
purposes of the FSIA. The court could have held that Cicippio's
claims were based on that particular activity because his damages
arose out of the kidnapping.221 Finally, the court could also have
held that there was a nexus between the United States and the
foreign state's activities. The third situation for finding a nexus
would probably apply in this case.222
Instead of taking advantage of an opportunity to carefully
address Cicippio's arguments and advance the important policies
discussed above, the D.C. Circuit Court merely engaged in political
speculations regarding foreign relations, a mode of analysis that
Congress specifically attempted to avoid when crafting the FSIA.
The court could have evaluated whether Cicippio's arguments
violated any existing judicial doctrine, instead of striking down his
argument based on a new, unpredictable judicial doctrine not
supported by any congressional intent or policy.
VII. CONCLUSION
As one of the more influential circuits in the U.S. courts of
appeals,' the D.C. Circuit Court in Cicippio strikes a blow to
all innocent victims of terrorism and foreign countries' hostage-
taking. The policies and justifications are compelling for a course
different than the one taken by the D.C. Circuit Court. Absent an
effective international forum, exclusion from federal courts could
mean that the damages and loss suffered as a result of terrorism
and hostage taking will go unvindicated, the victim permanently
and unjustly bearing all of the costs. Additionally, the FSIA
provides tools, given by Congress, with which to take this different
course.224 The commercial activities exception is flexible enough
221. The D.C. Circuit Court did not consider this alternative holding because the case
was dismissed for failure to meet the first element of commercial activity. Cicippio v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F. 3d 164, 168 (1994); see also Part III.C.
222. See supra Part III.C.3.; The D.C. Circuit Court did not consider this possibility
because it dismissed the case on the first element, focusing on the definition of commercial
activity.
223. Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, Vol 2, D.C. Circuit, Prentice Hall Law &
Business, 1994 ("This court is deservedly the second most important court in the country").
224. See supra Part VI.
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to allow for this course without undermining the statutory
framework for consistent, predictable adjudication of sovereign
immunity.
The clear result in this case, however, is not that the D.C.
Circuit Court was unable to chart this new course, but that it was
unwilling to do so based on its own speculation regarding interna-
tional politics. Moreover, in the process of carrying out its own
agenda on foreign relations, the court placed an obstacle in the
way of other courts that will attempt to chart this new course. The
D.C. Circuit Court's justifications for failing to take this new
course are weak because it argues that congressional intent
mandates its decision, even though the court is unable to find such
intent-written or implied-anywhere. Its justification for creating
the obstacle of an added requirement is even weaker because it
seems to deviate from the recent Supreme Court case, Saudi
Arabia v. Nelson.
The battle is not over, however. Senator Arlen Specter of
Pennsylvania and Representative Romano Mazzoli of Kentucky
have both introduced bills to amend the FSIA.2 5 Each bill
amends the FSIA such that it would allow U.S. citizens who are
the victims of genocide or state-sponsored terrorism to sue foreign
governments in U.S. district courts. So far, these bills have cleared
the respective judiciary committees of both houses of Con-
gress. 226  The fate of these bills remains to be seen. In the
interim, however, Cicippio continues to be held captive, now by
the FSIA and his own government.
Kevin Leung*
225. Senator Specter presented a bill to the Senate, and Congressmen Mazzoli
presented a bill to the House. See Amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, Hearing before the Subcomm. on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1992).
226. Rodriguez, supra note 2, at 2.
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